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Caveat: This is a preprint of a paper of mine appearing in Kant 
Studien. Do not quote from this preprint, only from the 
forthcoming version. 
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In this essay, I call attention to Kant’s and Whewell’s attempt to provide 
bridging principles between a priori principles and scientific laws. Part of 
Kant’s aim in the Opus postumum (ca. 1796-1803) was precisely to 
bridge the gap between the metaphysical foundations of natural science 
(on the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) see section 
1) and physics by establishing intermediary concepts or ‘Mittelbegriffe’ 
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(henceforth this problem is referred to as ‘the bridging-problem’). I 
argue that the late-Kant attempted to show that the concept of ‘moving 
force’, an intermediary concept derived from a priori principles, could be 
given empirical content so that concrete scientific knowledge is arrived at. 
Thus, the late-Kant wished not only to show that proper scientific laws 
are necessary a priori (as he had shown in the Metaphysical Foundations 
of Natural Science) but also that intermediary concepts could be derived 
from a priori principles which, when interpreted empirically, resulted in 
the specific forces as established by physics (see section 2). 
 Of course, William Whewell never knew about Kant’s Opus 
postumum and his attempt to bridge the gap between the metaphysical 
foundations of science and physics. However, it is striking that Whewell 
had similar concerns about the Critique of Pure Reason and the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science as Kant himself. 
According to Whewell, the Kantian project was incomplete because it did 
not show how ‘modifications’ (in the sense of concretizations) of a priori 
principles could result in empirical laws (section 3). Next, it will be 
argued, by taking into account several of Whewell’s philosophical 
notebooks which have scarcely been studied systematically, that 
Whewell’s doctrine of Fundamental Ideas grew out of his dissatisfaction 
with the Kantian project with respect to the bridging problem and that his 
own philosophical position should be seen as an attempt to bypass the 
bridging-problem. 
 
 
1. Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 
 
The publication of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787) is 
traditionally seen as the apex of Kant’s transcendental project – in which 
he sought to unravel the synthetic a priori concepts of reason (“das 
synthetische Erkentnis a priori aus Begriffen verstanden” 1 ). Kant’s 
famous table of transcendental categories, which expounds the necessary 
conditions of human conceptualisation of all possible experiences, is in 
Kant’s own words “indispensable in the theoretical part of philosophy for 
                                                 
1
 OP, AA 21: 60.16-22, cf. 63.12-15, 67.18-23, 69.8-11, 73.11-16, 74.01-03, 
75.07-09, 77.04-07, 82.08-24, 85.03-05, 86.18-23, 87.11-15, 89.03-07, 90.22-26, 
94.05-09, 99.25-27, 103.04-08, 104.03-07, 107.12-15, 119.13-18, 133.13-15, 
also: OP, AA 22: 81.03-04, 113.08-11.  
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completely outlining the plan for the whole of a science insofar as it 
rests on a priori concepts, and dividing it mathematically in accordance 
with determinate principles”2. In similar spirit, in the preface to his 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (published in 1786, i.e. 
five years after the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason) in which 
Kant gave an a priori deduction of “matter in general”3, he confidently 
wrote: 
 
In everything that is called metaphysics one can hope for the 
absolute completeness of the sciences, of such a kind one may 
expect in no other type of cognition. Therefore, just as in the 
metaphysics of nature in general, here the completeness of the 
metaphysics of corporeal nature can confidently be expected.4 
 
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), Kant noted that he had 
now brought his transcendental project to a close.5  His philosophical 
project prima facie seems to be surrounded by a halo of completeness, 
certainty and comprehensiveness. However, the late-Kant thought 
otherwise. 
From at least 1796 (and perhaps earlier6), Kant became aware of 
the incompleteness of his philosophical system with respect to natural 
philosophy which he had addressed in his Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science and, correspondingly, he tried to complete his project by 
composing the Opus postumum – a work that, according to Kant’s own 
                                                 
2
 KrV, AA 03: 95.14-23; 214 [bold in translation]. Original: “Denn daß diese 
Tafel im theoretischen Theile der Philosophie ungemein dienlich, ja 
unentbehrlich sei, den Plan zum Ganzen einer Wissenschaft, so fern sie auf 
Begriffen a priori beruht, vollständig zu entwerfen und sie systematisch nach 
bestimmten Principien abzutheilen […]”. 
3
 Friedman (1992), 216. 
4
 MAN, AA 04: 473.16-21; 9 [italics in the last sentence added]. Original: “[…] 
in Allem, was Metaphysik heißt, die absolute Vollständigkeit der Wissenschaften 
gehofft werden kann, dergleichen man sich in keiner anderen Art von 
Erkenntnissen versprechen darf, mithin eben so, wie in der Metaphysik der Natur 
überhaupt, also auch hier die Vollständigkeit der Metaphysik der körperlichen 
Natur zuversichtlich erwartet werden kann; […]”. 
5
 KU, AA 05: 170.21-27. 
6
 See Eckart Förster’s editorial introduction to the Opus postumum (xvi, xxxv-
xxxvii). We know for sure that Kant began working on this material in 1796 
when he retired from academics. 
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suggestion, had the running title Transition from the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science to Physics. 7  The reason for Kant’s 
discontent with the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science is 
spelled out in the following section. 
Let us first give a general overview what Kant’s project was in the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (we shall focus on the 
relation between metaphysics and natural philosophy).8  This technical 
                                                 
7
 OP, AA 21: 373.02-03; 10. 
8
 The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science addresses four issues: 
phoronomy, i.e. the study of “motion as a pure quantum in accordance with its 
composition, without any quality of the movable” (“die Bewegung als ein reines 
Quantum nach seiner Zusammensetzung ohne alle Qualität des Beweglichen”) 
(first chapter), dynamics, i.e. the study of motion “as belonging to the quality of 
matter, under the name of an original moving force” (“zur Qualität der Materie 
gehörig unter dem Namen einer ursprünglich bewegenden Kraft”) (second 
chapter), mechanics, i.e. the study of “matter with this quality as in relation to 
another through its own inherent force” (“die Materie mit dieser Qualität durch 
ihre eigene Bewegung gegen einander in Relation”) (third chapter), and finally, 
phenomenology, i.e. the study of motion or rest “in relation to the mode of 
representation or modality, and thus as appearance of the outer senses” (“auf die 
Vorstellungsart oder Modalität, mithin als Erscheinung äußerer Sinne”) (fourth 
chapter) (MAN, AA 04: 477.03-13; 12). Note that this division of chapters 
corresponds to the four categories: quantity, quality, relation and modality, 
respectively. In the first chapter of this opusculum, Kant considered matter as 
that which is movable in space and movability as quantity of motion (MAN, AA 
04: 480.12-13; 15, 495.05-10; 31). When we observe matter in motion we 
always do so in relative space (absolute space is not an object of experience and 
refers to “only any other relative space, which I can always think beyond the 
given space, and which I can only defer to infinity beyond any space” (“nur 
einen jeden andern relativen Raum, den ich mir außer dem gegebenen jederzeit 
denken kann, und den ich nur über jeden gegebenen ins Unendliche 
hinausrücke”) (MAN, AA 04: 481.34-35; 16; cf. Friedman (1992), 142-143)). He 
also showed how quantity of motion of composition of motion can be 
constructed a priori. In the second chapter, he shows that matter fills space 
“through the repulsive forces of all its parts” (“durch repulsive Kräfte aller ihrer 
Theile”) (MAN, AA 04: 499.06-09; 36) (he therefore considered such repulsive 
forces as the primary essential qualities of matter), that attraction is the 
secondary quality of matter (MAN, AA 04: 499.11-16; 36)), and that matter is 
indivisible to infinity (MAN, AA 04: 503.21-22; 40). In this chapter he thus 
treated matter qua quality. In the third chapter, Kant considers the forces of 
bodies as communicating motion to one another (e.g. by impact) and derives 
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treatise is essentially a metaphysical study of matter. As Kant puts it, it 
deals with the “metaphysics of corporeal nature” (“eine abgesonderte 
Metaphysik der körperlichen Natur der allgemeinen”)9. This exercise is 
relevant to general metaphysics since it gives meaning to the pure 
concepts of understanding and furnishes examples (intuitions) in which 
the concepts and propositions of metaphysics are realized.10  
For Kant, natural science meant physics, and physics was, at the 
time, synonymous to Newtonian mechanics.11 The overarching goal was, 
in line with the Critique of Pure Reason, to elucidate the metaphysics of 
science that gives proper science (as apposed to improper science which 
treats its object according to empirical laws only and not according to a 
priori principles) its apodictic certainty. 12  In the Metaphysical 
Foundations, Kant sought to investigate the pure part13 of proper natural 
philosophy, i.e. the metaphysics that natural philosophy presupposes. 
“Now”, Kant noted, “the latter [i.e. the pure part of natural philosophy] 
must always contain solely principles that are not empirical (for precisely 
this reason it bears the name of a metaphysics)”.14 In doing so, Kant 
meant to offer a “genuine metaphysics of science” (“eine wirkliche 
Metaphysik der körperlichen Natur”), i.e. a complete analysis of the 
                                                                                                              
Newton’s laws of motion “from general metaphysics” (“[a]us der allgemeinen 
Metaphysik”) (MAN, AA 04: 543.22-25; 83; cf. Watkins (2001) – Kant uses 
metaphysics here (which represents a priori the condition under which alone 
objects, whose concept must be empirically given, can be further determined a 
priori) in contrast to transcendental philosophy (which represents a priori the 
universal conditions under which alone things can be objects of cognition (KrV, 
AA 05: 181.15-16)). Here he dealt with matter as having a moving force. In the 
fourth chapter, he shows that rectilinear, i.e. inertial, motion is a possible 
predicate, that circular, i.e. orbital motion, is an actual predicate and that in every 
motion of a body relative to the other an equal and opposite motion of the latter 
is necessary (MAN, AA 04: 544.32-33; 94). Here he dealt with how motion can 
be experienced modally. 
9
 MAN, AA 04: 478.15-16; 13. 
10
 MAN, AA 04: 478.15-19; 13. 
11
 See Friedman (2003a). 
12
 MAN, AA 04: 468.17-18; 4. 
13
 MAN, AA 04: 469.12; 5. 
14
 MAN, AA 04: 469.31-33; 5, cf. 482.08-09; 17. Original: “Diese muß nun zwar 
jederzeit lauter Principien, die nicht empirisch sind, enthalten (denn darum führt 
sie eben den Namen einer Metaphysik).” 
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concept of matter “in general” (“überhaupt”) which “makes use of 
no particular experiences, but only that which it finds in isolated 
(although intrinsically empirical) concept itself, in relation to the pure 
intuitions in space and time, and in accordance with laws that already 
essentially attach to the concept of nature in general”15. Kant thus isolated 
metaphysics from physics in the Metaphysical Foundations and it was 
precisely this separation between both disciplines that would later worry 
him. Metaphysical knowledge, Kant noted, does not proceed by 
extending empirical knowledge (e.g. by performing observations and 
experiments or by applying mathematics to phenomena) but by attaining 
cognition of what lies beyond the boundaries of experience.16  The reason 
that Kant thought that he had provided a complete metaphysical outline 
of natural philosophy lies in the fact that he thought that the object of 
metaphysics is considered in accordance with all necessary laws of 
thought, which yield a determinate number of cognitions that might be 
completely exhausted by the table of categories. By contrast, natural 
science itself has no such determinateness as it involves “an infinite 
manifold of intuitions (pure or empirical), and thus an infinite manifold 
of objects of thought” 17 . Correspondingly, Kant concluded that the 
metaphysical foundations “is useful only for the purpose of guiding 
natural philosophy, so far as this is ever possible, to explore dynamical 
grounds of explanation”18. 
 
 
2. Kant’s Opus postumum and the hiatus in systemato 
 
                                                 
15
 MAN, AA 04: 472.07-11; 8. Original: “[…] sich keiner besonderen 
Erfahrungen, sondern nur dessen, was sie im abgesonderten (obzwar an sich 
empirischen) Begriffe selbst antrifft, in Beziehung auf die reinen Anschauungen 
im Raume und der Zeit (nach Gesetzen, welche schon dem Begriffe der Natur 
überhaupt wesentlich anhängen) bedient […]”. 
16
 MAN, AA 04: 477.14-35; 13. 
17
 MAN, AA 04: 473.26-28; 10. Original: “[…] eine unendliche Mannigfaltigkeit 
von Anschauungen (reinen oder empirischen), mithin Objecten des Denkens 
darbieten […]”. 
18
 MAN, AA 04: 534.26-30; 74. Original: “ist […] nur zu der Absicht nützlich, 
[…], so weit als es immer möglich ist, auf die Erforschung der dynamischen 
Erklärungsgründe zu leiten […]”. 
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Left as private notes, the folios composing the Opus postumum 19 
are often redundant and they might prima facie be considered as an 
unconnected whole. In the Opus postumum, Kant addressed a cornucopia 
of different topics.20 The sections that will occupy us here are the ones in 
which Kant deals with the transition from the metaphysical foundations 
of natural philosophy to physics (see infra). Kant began by pointing out 
that this transition should be a step, not a leap: 
 
                                                 
19
 This posthumous work only recently drew scholarly attention in the English 
literature. See especially: Caygill (2005), Friedman (1992), Ch. 5, Friedman 
(2003b), and Förster (2000). See further Mathieu (1989). Some useful and 
‘older’ studies also deserve to be mentioned: Adickes (1920), Hoppe (1969), and 
Tuschling (1971). 
20
 Förster’s editorial introduction to the Opus postumum (xxxviii-xliv). For 
instance, Kant argues that the ether is to be regarded “not just as a hypothetical 
material, but as a real world-material – given a priori by reason and counting as 
a principle of the possibility of the experience of the system of moving bodies” 
(“nicht nur als h y p o t h e t i s c h e r  S t o f f  um gewisse Erscheinungen erklären 
zu können sondern als realer und a priori durch die Vernunft gegebener 
Weltstoff”) (OP, AA 21: 216.03-07; 67, cf. 223.10-15; 72, 229.10-12; 76, 
550.10-18; 80). Kant also discussed the Selbstsetzungslehre according to which 
self-consciousness is a logical act of thought in which the self makes himself into 
an object (OP, AA, 22: 413.02-10; 179-180, 119.10-19; 202) (cf. “[t]he first act 
of the faculty of representation (facultas repraesentativa) is the representation of 
oneself (apperceptio) through which the subject makes itself into an object 
(apperceptio simplex)” (“Der erste Act des Vorstellungsvermögens (facultas 
repraesentativa) ist die Vorstellung seiner selbst (apperceptio) wodurch das 
Subject sich selbst zum Objecte macht (apprehensio simplex)”) (OP, AA 22: 
43.07-09; 178)). According to Kant, a subject does not only constitute itself as an 
object but also as a person with moral duties subjected to the categorical 
imperative – this moral constitution of the self leads to the concept  of God (OP, 
AA 22: 117.01-06; 200-201, 123.21-28-124.01-02; 204-205). Next, Kant also 
develops transcendental philosophy as philosophy of the self-constitution of 
reason which inevitably creates the ideas of God, world and moral duty (OP, AA 
21: 9-156; 218-256). 
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Progress (progressus) 21  in knowledge (qua science in 
general) begins with the collection of the elements of knowledge, 
then connects them [in the] manner in which they are arranged 
(systematically). For the division of this enterprise into a doctrine 
of elements and a doctrine of method constitutes the supreme 
division; the former presents the concepts, the latter their 
arrangement in the order to found a scientific whole. The transition 
(transitus) from one form of knowledge to another must be a step 
(passus) only, not a leap (saltus); that is, the doctrine of method 
requires one to pass from the metaphysical foundation of natural 
science to physics – from concepts of nature given a priori to 
empirical ones which yield empirical knowledge. The rule herein 
will be […] to proceed like elephants, which do not put one of their 
four feet a step further until they feel that the other three stand 
firm.22 
                                                 
21 Kant apparently thought that each scientific discipline begins with a 
systematization followed by an exposition of an adequate theoretical foundation: 
“If, however, the grounds or principles themselves are still in the end merely 
empirical, as in chemistry [of which he secretly hoped that it could be soon 
“physicalized” (Friedman (1992), 287)], for example, and the laws from which 
the given facts are explained through reason are mere laws of experience, then 
they carry with them no consciousness of their necessity (they are not apodictally 
certain), and thus the whole of cognition does not deserve the name of a science 
in the strict sense; chemistry should therefore be called a systematic  art 
[systematische Kunst] rather than a science.” (“Wenn aber diese Gründe oder 
Principien in ihr, wie z. B. in der Chemie, doch zuletzt blos empirisch sind, und 
die Gesetze, aus denen die gegebene Facta durch die Vernunft erklärt werden, 
blos Erfahrungsgesetze sind, so führen sie kein Bewußtsein ihrer 
Nothwendigkeit bei sich (sind nicht apodiktisch-gewiß), und alsdann verdient 
das Ganze in strengem Sinne nicht den Namen einer Wissenschaft, und Chemie 
sollte daher eher systematische Kunst als Wissenschaft heißen.”) (MAN, AA 04: 
468.23-29; 4). 
22
 OP, AA 21: 386.27-33-387.01-09; 12-13, cf. 407.22-28; 19. Original: “Das 
F o r t s c h r e i t e n  in einer Erkentnis als Wissenschaft überhaupt (progreßus) 
fängt davon an die Elemente derselben aufzufinden und dann die Art wie sie 
zusammengeordnet werden sollen (systematisch) zu verknüpfen da dann die 
Eintheilung dieses Geschäftes in Elementarlehre und Methodenlehre die oberste 
Eintheilung ausmacht, wovon jene die Begriffe diese die Anordnung derselben 
um ein Ganzes der Wissenschaft zu begründen vorstellig macht. Der Ubergang 
(transitus) von einer Art der Erkentnis zu einer andern muß nur ein Schritt 
(paßus), kein Sprung (saltus) seyn d. i. die Methodenlehre gebietet von den 
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The transition from metaphysics to physics cannot lie in the metaphysical 
foundations of physics, which stipulates only the general nature of the 
two primitive forces of attraction and repulsion, for “these furnish no 
specifically determined, empirical properties, and one can imagine no 
specific [forces] of which one could know whether they exist in nature, 
or whether their existence be demonstrable”23. Bridging this gap was one 
of his last philosophical challenges. In a letter to Christian Garve, on 21 
September 1798, Kant admitted that this project was a true torment of 
Tantalus (“ein Tantalischer Schmerz”) and that its failure would leave 
critical philosophy incomplete.24 
According to the late-Kant, natural philosophy essentially consists 
of two parts: (i) the metaphysical foundation of physics, which unravels 
the a priori principles of physics in general, and (ii) proper physics, 
which deals with the empirical contents of a priori principles (or put 
differently, which “proceeds from empirical principles” (“von 
empirischen Principien ausgeht”)25). In other words, in the metaphysical 
part of natural philosophy we spell out the a priori principles of physics; 
in the physical part we provide these abstract principles with concrete 
empirical contents. In this sense, metaphysics provides the form and 
physics the content or matter of those forms: 
 
The concept of a science of nature (philosophia naturalis) is the 
systematic representation of the laws of motion [“Gezetze der 
Bewegung”] of outer objects in space and time, insofar as these 
[laws] can be known a priori (thus as necessary).26 For empirical 
                                                                                                              
metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft zur Physik von 
Begriffen der Natur die a priori gegeben sind zu empirischen welche ein 
Erfahrungserkentnis liefern ü b e r z u s c h r e i t e n :  wobey dann die Regel seyn 
wird (nach dem schertzenden Spruch eines Philosophen) es zu machen wie die 
Elephanten die nicht eher einen der 4 Füße einen Fuß weiter setzen als bis sie 
fühlen daß die andern drey feststehen.” 
23
 OP, AA 22: 282.13-17; 100 [italics added]. Original: “[…] die geben gar keine 
besonders bestimmte von der Erfahrung anzugebende Eigenschaften u. man kann 
keine specifische ausdenken von denen man wissen könnte ob sie auch in der 
Natur sind oder auch ob die Existenz von solchen erweislich sey […]”. 
24
 Br, AA 12: 257.07. See Förster (1987) for ample contextualisation. 
25
 OP, AA 21: 524.15-16; 36. 
26
 Cf. MAN, AA 04: 468.17-29; 4.  
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knowledge of them concerns only contingent knowledge of 
these outer appearances, only to be acquired by experience, and it 
is not philosophy but merely an aggregate of perceptions – yet its 
completeness as a system, is, nonetheless, an object of philosophy. 
The supreme division of the science of nature [philsophia naturalis] 
according to its content can be none other than that between its 
metaphysical foundations, which are founded entirely in concepts 
of the relation of motion and rest of outer objects, and physics 
which systematically orders the content of empirical knowledge of 
them, and which, as stated, has the task of moving toward 
completeness in its elements – although it cannot count on this 
certainty.27 
 
Scientific laws thus have a double foundation: an empirical one and an a 
priori one. Similarly, pure experience cannot establish the necessity and 
universality of a scientific proposition: we can only establish that there is 
no exception to this or that rule.28 In the Opus postumum, Kant objected 
to the title of Newton’s Principia mathematica philosophiae naturalis, of 
which a more appropriate title should have been Scientiae naturalis 
principia mathematica29, on the grounds that a mathematical foundation 
is merely instrumental, indirect30 and partly based on experience, and thus 
not properly speaking philosophical: 
                                                 
27
 OP, AA 21: 402.12-26; 14-15 [italics in last sentence added], cf. OP, AA 22: 
265.18-22). Original: “Der Begriff von einer N a t u r w i s s e n s c h a f t  
(philosophia naturalis) ist die systematische Vorstellung der Gestze der 
Bewegung der äußeren Gegenstände im Raume und der Zeit so fern jene a priori 
mithin als nothwendig erkannt werden können; denn das empirische Erkentnis 
derselben was das Zufallige nur durch Erfahrung erwerbliche Erkenntnis dieser 
äußeren Erscheinungen betrifft so ist das nicht Philosophie sondern nur ein 
Aggregat von Warnehmungen dessen Vollstandigkeit als eines Systems doch ein 
Gegenstand für die Philosophie ist. Die Obereintheilung der Naturwissenschaft 
ihrem Inhalte nach kann nun keine andere seyn als die in die 
m e t a p h y s i s c h e  A n f a n g s g r  d e  derselben die gänzlich auf Begriffen 
vom Verhältnisse der Bewegung und der Ruhe äußerer Gegenstände gegründet 
sind und die P h y s i k  welche den Inhalt der Erfahrungserkentnis derselben 
systematisch ordnet welche also wie gesagt mit ihren Elementen auf 
V o l l s t ä n d i g k e i t  zwar nicht sichere Rechnung machen kann, aber darauf 
hinzuwirken den Beruf hat.” 
28
 KrV, AA 03: 29.02-06; 137. 
29
 OP, AA 22: 490.08-14; 140. 
30
 OP, AA 22: 85.03.  
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They are only an instrument (albeit a most necessary one) for the 
calculation of the magnitude of motions and moving forces (which 
must be given by observation of nature) and for the determination 
of their laws for physics (so that the quality of the motions and 
moving forces can be specified in regard to the central forces of 
bodies in circular motion […]) Consequently, this doctrine 
properly forms no part of the philosophical study of nature.31 
 
Natural science (dealing with empirical knowledge and expressed in 
mathematical terms) is distinct from metaphysics: “both sciences proceed 
from a priori principles, [but] the difference is that the former does so 
from intuitions, the latter from a priori concepts – a difference so great 
that it is as if, in the transition from one to another, reason itself […] 
were to displace one into quite different worlds”32. Mathematics supplies 
“only the application of concepts to intuitions a priori” (“nur die 
Anwendung der Begriffe auf Anschauungen a priori”) 33 . In the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant did not separate 
mathematics from metaphysics.34  
Kant further divides philosophia naturalis into (i) physica 
generalis (which deals only with “only the properties of matter 
                                                 
31
 OP, AA 21: 482.04-15; 43, cf. 120.10-12, 123.11-21, 161.03-14, cf. OP, AA 
22: 490.05-07; 139, 512.14-15; 151, 519.09-12; 155. Original: “[…] die 
m a t h e m a t i s c h e  Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft […] ist […] nur ein 
und zwar sehr nöthiges Instrument die Große der Bewegungen und bewegender 
Kräfte welche letztere in der Naturbeobachtung gegeben seyn müssen zu 
schätzen und die Gesetze derselben für die Physik zu bestimmen (so daß die 
Qualität derselben in Ansehung der Centralkrafte an im Kreise bewegten 
Korpern […] angegeben werden können), so daß folglich diese Lehre eigentlich 
keinen Theil der philosophischen Naturkunde ausmacht […]”. 
32
 OP, AA 22: 543.17-23; 82-83. Original: “Beyde sind durch eine 
unüberschreitbare Kluft von einander geschieden und, obzwar beyde 
Wissenschaften von Principien a priori ausgehen, so ist doch der Unterschied 
daß die erstere es von A n s c h a u u n g e n  die zweyte von B e g r i f f e n  a priori 
thut so groß, als ob man in dem Übergange von einer zur anderen durch dieselbe 
V e r n u n f t  (denn das bedeutet Erkenntnis a priori) in ganz verschiedene 
Welten versetzt würde.” 
33
 OP, AA 22: 240.20-22; 56, cf. 490.22.27; 138-139, 512.11-21; 151, 515.11-13; 
153. 
34
 Friedman (1992), 222-223. 
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[according to Kant the cornerstone (“Anfangsgründe”) of the 
metaphysics of natural philosophy 35 ] in outer objects” (“nur die 
Eigenschaften der M a t e r i e  an äußeren Gegenständen der Erfahrung”)) 
and (ii) physica specialis which “attends to bodies formed from this 
matter in a particular way, and which draws up a system of them” (“auf 
die aus jener Materie auf besondere Art geformte Körper sieht und von 
ihnen ein System aufstellt”).36 Kant had indeed dealt with the former in 
his Metaphysical Foundations, where he had provided a priori 
derivations of the central concept of physics: matter (and material 
substance), but he remained silent on the transition to physics. He had 
addressed physica generalis but not physica specialis. On the relation 
between both he noted: “there can be a relationship of the one form of 
knowledge to the other which rests neither entirely on principles a priori, 
nor on empirical principles” 37. As the late-Kant wanted to show in full 
detail how the a priori principles of knowledge were concretized in 
physics, he took the theoretical deficit of his transcendental doctrine with 
respect to physica specialis very seriously. He wanted to fill in this gap 
by rendering explicit how a priori concepts are applied not in 
metaphysical but in physical-dynamic functions to real bodies such that a 
system of empirical concepts and laws is arrived at.38 However, Kant 
noticed, there is a leap between metaphysics and physics “[t]hus”, he 
concluded, “there must be mediating concepts which [enable] the 
transmission from the one doctrine to the other, i.e. the application of a 
priori concepts to experience in general”39. The metaphysical foundations 
of science offer no material for physics: “they are divisions for the 
concept which require to be filled; and mere forms without an underlying 
                                                 
35
 OP, AA 22: 166.05. 
36
 OP, AA 21: 407.16-20; 18f. On an unpublished folio of the Opus postumum, 
Kant distinguished between “dem Elementarsystem der bewegenden Kräfte der 
Materie” and “dem Weltsystem” (OP, AA 22: 226.08-10). 
37
 OP, AA 21: 402.27-403.01-02; 15. Original: “[…] kann es ein Verhaltnis der 
einen Erkentnisart zu der anderen geben welches weder ganz auf Principien a 
priori noch auf empirischen” […]. 
38
 OP, AA 21: 477.18-20; 41, cf. OP, AA 22: 282.09-11; 101. 
39
 OP, AA 21: 311.11-13; 25. Original: “So muß es also Mittelbegriffe geben die 
blos den Übergang von der einen Naturlehre zur anderen überzuschreiten d. i. 
zur Anwendung der Begriffe a priori auf Erfahrung überhaupt anzuwenden wie 
denn die Principien der Moglichkeit der Erfahrung überhaupt selbst a priori 
gegeben seyn müssen.” 
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material can as little yield a system of experience, as richly distributed 
material without form”40. Moving forces of matter can only be known by 
experience. The task is then to classify the real objects of nature 
according to their a priori principles. Such classification would result in a 
universal doctrine of forces (physiologia generalis). 
So, according to the late-Kant, the main philosophical task lay in 
bridging the broad gulf (“hiatus in systemato”) between metaphysics and 
physics, “the science of the coordination of all empirical representations 
(all perceptions) into a system or whole”41, by means of what he called 
intermediary concepts [‘Mittelbegriffe’ 42 ] “which form a distinctive 
construction” (“welche ein besonderes Bauwerk ausmacht möglich 
gemacht werden”)43. Kant noted that “a system can never be constructed 
out of merely empirical concepts” (“[a]us blos empirischen Begriffen 
kann nie ein System gezimmert werden”) 44  – for indeed, as Kant 
famously wrote at the beginning of the Critique “[r]eason in order to be 
taught by nature, must, approach nature with its principles in one hand, 
according to which alone the agreement among appearances can count as 
laws, and, in the other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance 
with these principles” 45 . Eckart Föster has correctly noticed that an 
important reason why Kant thought that the Critique and his 
                                                 
40
 OP, AA 21: 474.25-28; 39. Cf. Förster (2002), 4. Original: “Es sind Fächer für 
den Begriff welche man auszufüllen verlangt und bloße Formen ohne einen 
ihnen untergelegten Stoff können eben so wenig wie ein reichlich hingeworfener 
Stoff ohne Formen ein Erfahrungssystem abgeben […]”. 
41
 OP, AA 21: 582.13-16; 90. Original: “[…] die Wissenschaft der 
Zusammenordnung aller e m p i r i s c h e n  Vorstellungen (aller Warnehmungen) 
zu einem System […]”. 
42
 For instance, according to Kant the concept of moving forces (of matter) has 
“applications to empirical concepts”, but at the same time it can be thought as a 
priori “according to the relations of the moving forces in space and time, and as 
such, can be completely classified” (OP, AA 21: 477.07-10; 41). 
43
 OP, AA 21: 476.16-17; 40. Friedman does not seem to pay much attention on 
Kant’s attempt to establish moving force as an intermediary concept between 
metaphysics physics and physics (Friedman (1992), 264). Neither does Förster 
(Förster (2000), 16). 
44
 OP, AA 21: 476.16-17; 40. 
45
 KrV, AA 03: 10.21-22; 109. Original: “Die Vernunft muß mit ihren Principien, 
nach denen allein übereinstimmende Erscheinungen für Gesetze gelten können, 
in einer Hand und mit dem Experiment, das sie nach jenen ausdachte, […]”. 
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Metaphysical Foundations remained incomplete was that they 
did not “supply physics with a guideline for a systematic investigation of 
the specific forces in nature” 46 . Kant’s final challenge was thus to 
construct the middle ground between physics and metaphysics.47 Part of 
the transition project consisted in showing how (abstract) matter could be 
turned into (physical) body. The transition takes place when a priori 
concepts are applied to real bodies.48 In the Metaphysical Foundations, 
Kant had conceived matter purely mechanically (quantity of matter was 
estimated by impulse and velocity), that is, he conceived matter merely as 
that which is movable in space.49 In physics, however, we treat matter 
dynamically, that is we study the moving forces as found in experience 
(or as Kant puts it “the movable, insofar it has moving force” (“d a s  
B e w e g l i c h e  vorstellt s o  f e r n  e s  b e w e g e n d e  K r a f t  h a t ”)50 
or “that which makes space an object of the senses” (“das w a s  d e n  
R a u m  z u m  G e g e n s t a n d e  d e r  S i n n e  m a c h t ”) 51 ). In the 
Metaphysical Foundations Kant had left out true dynamical forces.52 Not 
surprisingly, in the Opus postumum Kant now stated that quantity of 
matter can only be estimated dynamically, i.e. by weighing.53 A condition 
for moving forces to be able to act is that they act not in a void but in the 
ether – hence, the importance of the ether proofs in the Opus postumum.54 
In empty space, no effects of forces could be perceived. Thus: the ether, 
the substance of which Kant thought it could unify physics, is an a priori 
given: without space being filled with matter no effect of the moving 
forces of matter could be sensed. 55  The ether proofs are therefore a 
necessary part in Kant’s transition project: the ether provides “the topic 
                                                 
46
 Förster’s editorial Introduction to the Opus postumum (xxxiv). Cf. OP, AA 21: 
616.24-26 [italics added]: “Dieser Theil ist der systematische Inbegrif der a 
priori denkbaren bewegenden Kräfte der Anziehung und Abstoβung mit ihrer 
Modificationen […]”. Cf. Friedman (2002), 261. 
47
 OP, AA 21: 117.01-05 
48
 OP, AA 21: 116.01-03. 
49
 MAN, AA 04: 537.12-13; 76. Cf. Carrier (2001), 122-123, 134). 
50
 OP, AA 22: 190.04-05; 51. 
51
 OP, AA 22: 514.01-02; 152. 
52
 Friedman (1992), 225. 
53
 Ibid., 27-29. 
54
 Förster (2000), 92-101. 
55
 OP, AA 21: 220.02-03; 70. 
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of the moving forces of matter”56. The ether was both a physical 
entity as well as a priori condition of our perception of dynamical forces. 
On a separate leaf, he began stating his solution to the bridging-
problem: 
 
Therefore the transition from metaphysics to physics, from the a 
priori concept of movable in space (i.e. the concept of matter in 
general) to the system of moving forces, can [proceed] only by 
means of that which is common to both – by means of the moving 
forces insofar as they act not on matter but rather united or 
opposed among one another, and thus form a system of the 
universal doctrines of forces (physiologia universalis) which 
stands between metaphysics and physics. Insofar as it contains for 
itself a system of the application of a priori concepts to experience, 
i.e. the investigation of nature, it combines metaphysics with 
physics in a system.57 
 
Kant suggested that all physical forces in rerum natura are “contained in 
the concepts of motion as active cause [i.e. moving force]” (“in dem 
Begrif der Bewegung als wirkender Ursache enthalten”) 58. According to 
Kant, the concept of ‘moving force’ can be thought of a priori according 
to the relations of moving forces in space and time and can thus be 
completely classified.59 The concept of ‘moving force’ (regulated by a 
priori principles) serves as an intermediary concept [‘Mittelbegrif’] that 
could be interpreted empirically. In other words, all concrete physical 
forces are regulated by the concept of ‘moving force’, a concept which in 
its turn is regulated by a priori principles. The concept of ‘moving force’ 
                                                 
56
 Förster (2002), 99. 
57
 OP, AA 21: 478.16-26; 42 [italics added]. Original: “Also kann der Ubergang 
von der Met. zur Physik von dem Begriffe a priori des Beweglichen im Raum d. 
i. dem Begrif einer Materie überhaupt zu dem System der bewegenden Kräfte 
nur durch das was beyden Gemein ist durch die bewegende Kräfte so wie sie 
nicht eben auf die Materie sondern unter einander vereinigend oder 
entgegengesetzt wirken und so ein System der allgemeinen Kräftenlehre 
(physiologia generalis) bilden welche zwischen der Met. und Phys. zwischen 
inne steht und indem sie für sich ein System der Anwendung der Begriffe a 
priori auf Erfahrung d. i. der Naturforschung enthalt das erste mit dem letzteren 
in einem System verbinden.” 
58
 OP, AA 21: 387.09-10; 13. 
59
 OP, AA 21: 477.07-14; 41. 
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thus stands between metaphysics and physics: it is regulated by a 
priori principles and given content by empirical observation. It is difficult 
to say whether Kant was ultimately satisfied with this solution: he never 
laid down his efforts at the printer’s. 
 
 
3. Whewell’s answer to the Kantian gap 
 
I shall first, document Whewell’s references to Kant in his philosophical 
notebooks (3.1). Secondly, I shall argue that Whewell, who took Kant’s 
philosophy as a point of departure for his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas, 
was unsatisfied with Kant’s philosophy of science because it did not 
show how ‘modifications’ (in the sense of concretizations) of a priori 
principles resulted in empirical laws and that he correspondingly tried to 
modify the Kantian project (3.2). In other words, according to Whewell, 
Kant had not solved the bridging problem. Nowhere in the following do I 
claim that Whewell was a Kantian. For instance, Whewell did not want to 
provide an extensive list of a priori principles, as he allowed that new 
Fundamental Ideas would emerge in the course of the history of science. 
The significance of Kantianism for Whewell’s philosophy has often been 
discussed in the literature.60 In defence of such significance, Robert E. 
Butts has claimed that Whewell “owes his theory of science to Kant”61. 
This is clearly an overstatement since Whewell was aware of the 
limitations of Kantianism and criticised it for not being able to solve the 
bridging-problem. Menachem Fisch and Laura J. Snyder have denied a 
substantial significance of Kant on Whewell’s philosophy. Menachem 
Fisch has pointed out that in Whewell’s notebook we cannot find any of 
the questions raised in the Critique.62 Recently, Laura J. Snyder claimed 
that Whewell’s philosophy is not derived from, nor greatly influenced by 
                                                 
60
 See Butts (1965), 162-164, Fisch (1985), 279 (footnote 19), Snyder (2006), 
44-47, and Yeo (1979), 500. For Whewell’s own criticisms on Kant, see 
Whewell (2001 [1860]), VII, 312-314, 334-336). For Whewell’s published work 
I have consulted: Collected Works of William Whewell (16 vols.), Ed. R. Yeo. 
Bristol: Thoemmes Press. Convention: between square brackets, I refer to the 
year in which the first edition of a work of Whewell appeared. I also add the 
volume-numbers of each work in the 2001 edition of Collected Works of William 
Whewell. 
61
 Butts (1994), 278. 
62
 Fisch (1991), 105. 
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Kant. 63  In the following, I will temper the claims of Fisch and 
Snyder without resorting to a naive picture of Whewell as ‘the English 
Kant’. The account I defend is more complex. More precisely, I shall 
argue that Whewell’s philosophical position developed in close dialogue 
with Kantian philosophy and should be seen as an answer to the bridging-
problem that could not, according to Whewell, be answered by Kant. 
Finally, we shall look at his doctrine of Fundamental Ideas as he later 
developed it (3.3). 
 
3.1. Kant: a philosophical point of departure for Whewell’s philosophy 
 
Whewell’s inclination toward Kantian philosophy and his familiarity with 
it can easily be gathered from several of his notebooks which were 
written between ca. 1830 and 1833. 64  For instance, in notebook five 
(dated around 1832), Whewell noted that “Kant had left nothing in the 
wide world of being but certain X’s, – things in themselves, without 
predicate or form, being altogether unknown to us”65. In the very same 
notebook, he left notes66 on Kant’s Kritik der praktischen Vernunft of 
which the influence can be traced in the section entitled “Of Practical 
Skill and of Speculative Knowledge” in the sixth notebook. In the sixth 
notebook, Whewell also drew on Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernuft67, as is 
clear from the following statement:  
                                                 
63
 Snyder (2006), 51. 
64
 Several notebooks, contained in the larger collection of Whewell Papers 
(henceforth “WP”), are preserved and can be consulted at Trinity College 
Cambridge, Wren Library (Whewell Papers, class-mark R.18.17). Convention: 
words or text between arrows pointed downwards refer to additions inserted 
from above; words or texts between arrows pointed upwards refer to additions 
inserted from below. It should be noted that some notebooks are numbered as 
books others as folios (foliated notebooks are always preceded by “f.”).  
65
 WP, R.18.175, 125 [underscore in original]. 
66
 Ibid., 181, 183, 184. 
67
 Cf. Whewell’s notes on the Kritik der reinen Vernuft composed between 18 
and 23 December 1825 (WP, R.18.913, f. 10r, f. 11r). In these folios, Whewell 
made notes on the distinction between analytical and synthetical knowledge, 
synthetic a priori judgements, intuition (Anschauung), transcendental knowledge, 
and the possibility of a priori synthetical principles, mathematics, science and 
metaphysics. Whewell first mentioned the Kritik der reinen Vernunft on 9 
February 1821 (WP, R.18.98, p. 15, also on 24 October 1821: WP, R.18.99, f. 41v, 
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The conditions of our perceptions, in consequence of wch we 
apprehend objects as existing in space and time, are capable, as we 
have seen, of giving truth to extensive and important sciences, that 
is, systematically arranged trains of speculative truth. But these 
conditions of our perception show themselves in another way, in 
which indeed, they operate ↓by↓ far ↓the↓ most extensively; and 
                                                                                                              
f. 42r (on this folio Whewell wrote “sensitive faculty – understanding – practical 
reason”)). In WP, R.1914, ff. 1r-5r, ff. 6r-7v, Whewell composed more detailed 
notes on the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (these were written between 25 July and 
8 September 1827). On f. 2r, he wrote: “The object of this celebrated work is to 
show the possibility of knowledge i.e. of universal and necessary truths.” 
Empirical knowledge in its own nature does not give necessity but only limited 
information. Hence, “the grounds of such knowledge must be sought in the 
constitution of the mind”. The powers of the mind are twofold: sensation and 
thought. Whewell noted that in sensation we have the conception of space and 
time and cause and effect, that these conceptions are not derived from experience, 
and express the “laws (forms) of our perceptive power” (ibid., also: f. 4r, f. 7r 
[underscore added]). The faculty of Reason provides us with various conceptions 
of understanding (Verstandesbegriffe) which enter into all our judgements and 
which can be enumerated as categories (ibid. f. 2r, also: f. 3v). The categories 
“give unity to the synthesis of a complex representation by wh. we comprehend 
its parts in one act of knowledge” (ibid., f. 2r-v [underscore added], also WP 
R.18.1710, p. 3). These conceptions are “of an a priori validity when applied to 
objects: that is we cannot learn anything respecting objects without its being 
included in them” (WP, R.1914, f. 2v). Moreover, experience is only possible by 
means of such conceptions (ibid., also: f. 4r). Representations are connected in 
the mind in a synthetic unity by the act of apperception: “[i]n order to have any 
knowledge we must excercise a synthetical operation belonging to ourselves” 
(ibid., f. 3r). On the category of cause he added: “But in time, wh. I assume as a 
ground of perception, I represent to myself a synthetical unity of what is 
complex, without wh. the relation of sequence could not be given. But this unity, 
as a condition of the conception of sequence omitting time, is the category of 
cause.”(ibid., f. 4r [underscore added], also: f. 7r). In the case of the perception 
of an object which has no homogeneous nature, the categories are applied by 
means of “general notions (abstract ideas) wh. are homogeneous with the 
categories on one hand & with perceptions on the other”. Kant refers to these 
general notions by the term “schemata of the Understanding” (ibid., f. 4v). 
Whewell also made some further notes on analytical and synthetical judgement 
and concluded his notes with: “The conceptions of the understanding acquire 
meaning of being referred to objects.” (ibid., f. 5r). 
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which, indeed, for various reasons, we might may 
consider as the primary use of this part of our internal constitution. 
The apprehension of things as existing and occurring in space and 
time, regulates every action of every principal creature.68 
 
Whewell learned from Kant’s philosophy the importance of the active 
powers of reason (pace Snyder). He noted that “the German system” has 
“not merely a tie connecting the impressions which we progressively 
receive, but a constitution of the active faculties which makes the 
impressions impossible without the connexion”69 . He stressed that in 
order to know we must perceive and conceive. Knowledge implies both 
passive as well as active thought: “collection of impressions” and “the 
operations of the reason”.70 The actions of the mind work on impressions 
provided by the senses.71 Whewell noted that by using language “we do 
not expose our impressions only, but expose them modified and 
transformed by the operations of our thoughts” 72, so that human minds 
are “perpetually exercising a formative and productive power”73, which is 
“exercised upon the rude material”74. Such principles, which “are part of 
the original furniture of the common or unsystematic reason”75 and which 
spell out “↓universal↓ and familiar modes of contemplating objects”76,  
have been brought to light and systematized during the course of human 
history. According to Whewell, “sound and real physical science consists 
in apprehending a general fact of observation by means of ↓distinct↓ 
ideas”77 . Whewell warned that he did not use the term “idea” in its 
customary sense and noted that “the ideas of which I have to speak are 
general notions of relation, connexion, dependence, by which ↓such↓ 
                                                 
68
 WP, R.18.176, 13. Also see R.18.177, 43. 
69
 WP, R.18.179, 11. 
70
 WP, R.18.178, f. 19r. 
71
 Ibid., f. 36v. 
72
 WP, R.18.177, 23. About 1821, Whewell noted – although not yet endorsing 
Kantianism – that in Kant’s philosophy the representation of the external world 
consists of “a modif.c of the mind wch may exist without being known” (WP, 
R.18.171, 105). 
73
 WP, R.18.177, 24. 
74
 Ibid., 41. 
75
 Ibid., 14. 
76
 Ibid., 18. 
77
 Ibid., 61, also: 63 [italics added]. 
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conceptions are combined with one another” 78 . Such ideas or 
conceptions involve “an act of the mind by which it gives a certain unity 
↓to each↓ of the groups of things so seemed”; furthermore, “[t]his act 
may be expressed by saying that we conceive the objects as one, and the 
faculty of the mind may be called conception”79. In other words, “the 
perceptions of this faculty of perceiving acts, are bound together by 
conceptions which give them unity”80.  
Kant’s transcendentalism was important to Whewell since it 
implied a shift from practical to contemplative “attention”. Kantianism, 
for Whewell, was a “contemplative” exercise that rendered explicit the 
conditions which are presupposed by our (practical) perceptions: 
 
The principles which had been followed through the investigation 
of practical propensities, might come to be the objects of a 
contemplative attention; and men, not content with the safe-
conduct ↓which they enjoy from↓ their practical perceptions, 
↓faithful↓ but silent guides, might begin to ask and answer 
concerning the path they were pursuing. They might turn their 
attention from the object to the method;81 
 
In several of these notebooks, Whewell sought to unravel “the general 
fundamental convictions and laws”82  underlying human reasoning and 
science. His aim was to show how these laws or principles gave rise to 
sound scientific knowledge: 
 
Our object is to ascertain the ↓general↓ laws which govern the 
formation and progress of knowledge in the largest sense; And the 
course which we purpose to follow leads us to examine their 
↓laws↓ in the first place, as they have operated in those branches 
of human knowledge which more peculiarly termed Sciences, and 
in which the certainty and progressive character of our knowledge 
are most striking and incontestable. […] Science may be ↑for our 
purpose↑ described as speculative knowledge of general truths.83 
 
                                                 
78
 Ibid., 61. 
79
 WP, R.18.178, f. 15r [underscore in original]; cf. R.18.1710, 3. 
80
 WP, R.18.178, f. 16r, cf. f. 32v. 
81
 WP, R.18.176, 33. 
82
 Ibid., 12. 
83
 Ibid., 84 [underscore in original]. 
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On space and time Whewell noted that “all things are presented to our 
apprehension under the conditions of space and time”84. Space and time 
are intuitions. When using the word “intuition” he used it as an 
equivalent to “the German word Anschauung”85. He noted that “[s]pace is 
not a notion obtained by experience”86 and that “the existence of space as 
a real and necessary condition of all objects as perceived”87. On time he 
wrote: “Time is a necessary condition in the presentation to our minds of 
all occurrences” 88 . Space, time, causation (and “the like”) express 
relations between our impressions.89 The concept of cause is not derived 
from experience.90 He wrote the following on Kant’s account of the idea 
of cause: 
 
While this series of disputes was going on in Scotland [Whewell is 
referring here to Hume, Stewart, and Brown], a great metaphysical 
genius ↓in Germany↓ was evolving his solution of the same 
problem. Kant’s speculations originate, as he informs us, in the 
trains of thought to which Hume’s writings gave rise, and the 
Critik [sic] der Reinen Vernunft, an examination of the pure 
Reason was published in 1781, with the view of showing the true 
nature of our knowledge. […] According to Kant, causality is a 
condition of our experiences; a connexion in events is requisite to 
our apprehending them as events; […] The ↓relation↓ of causation 
is a condition of our thinking of things, as the relations of space 
are a condition of our seeing them.91  
 
These conditions “reside in the constitution of the mind”92 and are the 
“conditions of experience”93, “Conditions of Inductivity”94, “Regulative 
& Interpretative Conceptions”95, or “the conditions of our receptivity”96. 
                                                 
84
 WP, R.18.177, 12. 
85
 WP, R.18.178, f. 67v [underscore in original]. 
86
 Ibid., f. 38v. 
87
 Ibid., f. 42r, cf. f. 58v. 
88
 Ibid., f. 56v. 
89
 WP, R.18.177, 16, 18. In a letter to Richard Jones, 21 August 1834, Whewell 
used the term “ideal relations” (WP, Add. Ms. c. 51175, f. 1v). 
90
 WP, R.18.179, 6. 
91
 Ibid., 10. On 11, Whewell wrote down the following reference to the Critique 
of Pure Reason: “K.R.V. p. 170”. 
92
 WP, R.18.178, f. 41v. 
93
 Ibid., f. 43r. 
  
22 
 
In notebook nine, Whewell set out to find an answer to the 
following paradox: if mechanics has empirical content how can it be 
necessary? In other words, “[i]n the phraseology usual among German 
writers” his aim was “to prove the possibility of the science of 
mechanics”97 (pace Fisch). However, according to Whewell, the Kantian 
account of the idea of cause, which is “indispensably true as far as it 
goes”, “requires further explanation”. 98  The notion of cause must be 
expressed “in the form of propositions in order that they may form a 
foundation for our reasonings”99. In other words, we must be able “to lay 
down certain Axioms, or Definitions which may be seen as Axioms, in 
order that we may have such a structure of Demonstration concerning 
causation in any of its modifications”100. Whewell drew a close analogy 
between the axioms of mechanics and the axioms of geometry: “The 
axioms of ↓mechanics↓ do, in fact, flow from our idea of cause, as 
necessarily as the axioms of geometry ↓do↓ from our intuition of 
space.”101. He then continued to show that the statement “that everything 
which happens must have a cause” is a partial expression of our idea of 
cause 102 , but that “we still have to show how it enters into the 
construction of the mechanical sciences”103. Whewell’s solution consisted 
in uncovering the Axioms of Causation which serve as general 
intermediate forms and could be given empirical content (see 3.2). In the 
case of mechanics, the Idea of Cause is modified into and concretized by 
the Idea of Force. Whewell clearly took over the idea of Kant that 
scientific knowledge derives from a priori principles. Nevertheless, he 
was dissatisfied with Kant’s failure to show how these a priori principles 
enter into the construction of science. In other words, according to 
                                                                                                              
94
 WP, R.18.1711, f. 1r, f. 30r. 
95
 WP, R.18.1713, f. c.75r. 
96
 WP, R.18.1711, f. 75v. 
97
 WP, R.18.179, 2. 
98
 Ibid., 12. 
99
 Ibid. 
100
 Ibid. [italics added]. 
101
 Ibid., 32. 
102
 He noted: “This Axiom expresses only a result, a consequence, ↓a derivative↓ 
of our idea of cause, a portion of the convictions which accompany it. The 
Axiom may be requisite in the exposition of our knowledge, but the idea itself is 
the foundation of the knowledge.” (ibid., 14). 
103
 Ibid. [underscore in original; italics added]. 
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Whewell, Kant had failed to provide bridging principles 
between the a priori principles and scientific laws which have empirical 
content. 
 
3.2. The 1834 paper on the necessity of the laws of mechanics 
 
In these notebooks (especially the eighth and ninth notebook), we find the 
materials that Whewell systematized into an important paper entitled On 
the Nature of the Truth of the Laws of Motion (1834) which was 
published shortly after the composition of these notebooks. The paper 
itself does not indicate that Whewell saw his solution as an improvement 
of Kantian natural philosophy. If, however, we juxtapose the notebooks 
and the paper, this becomes more obvious. In his 1834 paper Whewell’s 
focus is on mechanics. Since the science of mechanics studies the causes 
(i.e. the forces) of motions, they depend on the universal principles 
presupposed in all our reasoning concerning causes.104 In other words, 
the truth of the laws of motion depends upon the principles applied in our 
everyday reasoning concerning causes.105 These principles of causation 
are expressed by means of the following three axioms: 
 
Axiom I. – Every change is produced by a cause. 
Axiom II.  – Causes are measured by their effects. 
Axiom III. – Action is always accompanied by an equal and opposite 
Reaction.106 
 
Inevitably and unconsciously we assume the truth of these axioms 
whether for practical or theoretical purposes. These axioms are 
necessarily true according to “our notions of material causation”107 and 
are “the universal and necessary rules of causation”108. Now, each of the 
laws of motion corresponds to and is based on the forms of these axioms: 
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the first law states that a body not acted upon by any force will go in 
a straight line with an invariable velocity (or put positively, that each 
non-inertial motion is caused by an impressed force); the second that, 
when an impressed force acts, its accelerative quantity is measured by the 
accelerative effect produced; and the third that, when one body acts upon 
another, there will be an equal and opposite reaction-force. From this 
Whewell concluded: 
 
And so far as the laws are announced in this form, they will be of 
absolute and universal truth, and independent of any particular 
experiment or observation whatever. But though these laws of 
motion are necessarily and infallibly true, they are, in the form in 
which we have stated them, entirely useless and inapplicable. It is 
impossible to deduce from them any definite and positive 
conclusion, without some additional knowledge or assumption.109 
 
What the precise cause of retardation is in the actual motions of bodies, 
how we should measure the accelerative effect, and how we should 
measure the action (i.e. the motive force110) can only be established by 
observation.111 Whewell wrote: 
 
The form, and even the language of these laws is of necessity what 
it is; but the interpretation and application of them is not possible 
without reference to fact. We may imagine many rules according 
to which bodies might move (for many sets of rules, different from 
the existing ones, are, so far as we can see, possible) and we would 
still have to assert – that velocity could not change without a cause 
– that change of action is proportional to the force which produces 
it, – and that action and reaction are equal and opposite. The truth 
of these assertions is involved in these notions of causation and 
matter, which the very attempt to know anything concerning the 
relations of matter and motion presupposes.112 
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The laws may be considered as a formula derived from à 
priori reasonings, where experience assigns the value of the terms 
which enter into the formula.113  
 
The laws of motion thus have both an empirical part and necessary part 
(which cannot be denied without self-contradiction, and, which is derived 
from a priori principles): 
 
The parts of the laws which I have stated as empirical, appear to 
me to be clearly of a different nature, as to the cogency of their 
truth, from the parts which are necessary; and the difference is, I 
think, established by the fact that these propositions were denied, 
contested, and modified, before they were finally established. If 
these truths could not be denied without a self-contradiction, it is 
difficult to understand how they could be (as they were) long 
obstinately controverted by mathematicians and others fully 
sensible to the cogency of necessary truths.114 
 
Whewell’s Axioms served as intermediary concepts. It is important to 
note that Whewell consistently endorsed this interpretation in his later 
work (esp. in the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences). The content of 
his solution never changed. What did change, however, was its domain of 
application.  
 
3.3. Whewell’s generalisation of the 1834 solution: the Philosophy of the 
Inductive Sciences (1840) 
 
As we have seen, in the 1834 paper Whewell’s focus was on mechanics. 
When he had finished his grand historical study on the history of the 
inductive sciences (1837), he generalized this solution to other domains 
of science which have progressed according to other Fundamental Ideas. 
The idea was that the laws arrived at in all other sciences were also 
necessary (because they derive their form from the Axioms of their 
corresponding Fundamental Idea) and empirical (because they are 
interpretations concretizations or ‘modifications’ of their Axioms). 
One of the most prominent goals of Whewell’s Philosophy of the 
Inductive Sciences was to show the place which Ideas have had in the 
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progress of science and in the discovery of new truths about the 
natural world.115 As each branch of science progressed, a Fundamental 
Idea was made more explicit. Some ideas are peculiar to one branch, 
others are common to more. For example, in the development of 
mechanics the Ideas of Force, Matter, and Cause are quintessential; in the 
Chemical Sciences, The Idea of Polarity, Chemical Affinity, and 
Substance; in crystallography, the Idea of Symmetry; in the Classificatory 
Sciences, the Idea of Resemblance and Natural Affinity; in the 
Physiological Sciences, the Idea of Assimilation, Irritability and Final 
Cause, etc. The progress of science, according to Whewell, was only 
possible by the fruitful combination of both metaphysics and 
experience 116 : “the metaphysical is a necessary part of the inductive 
movement”117 . Consequently, the progress of science has its place in 
observation, in the application of Ideas (which regulate our active 
operations of the mind 118 ), and in the union of the two. 119  Great 
discoverers are distinguished from barren speculators “not by having no 
metaphysics in their heads, but by having good metaphysics while their 
adversaries had bad; and by binding their metaphysics to their physics, 
instead of keeping the two asunder” 120 . Whewell referred to this 
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necessary intertwinement of ideal and empirical elements for the 
constitution of knowledge as “the Fundamental Antithesis of Philosophy”: 
knowledge about the world always involves both “Thoughts and 
Things”. 121  In every acquisition of human knowledge “there must be 
some thing about which I know, and an internal act of me who know”122. 
When Kepler discovered the elliptic orbit of planets, he applied the 
concept of ellipse to the motion of Mars. The elliptical orbit is 
constructed and supplied by the mind. We see through ideas, even if we 
are unaware of them.123 Theory and fact can only be separated from each 
other in terms of the ways wherein they are contemplated: “for a Theory 
(that is, a true theory) may be described as a Thought which is 
contemplated distinct from Things and seen to agree with them; while a 
Fact is a combination of our Thoughts with Things in so complete 
agreement that we do not regards them as separate”124 . Fundamental 
Ideas are at the heart of Whewell’s philosophy of knowledge and they 
perform the same role as Kant’s synthetic a priori. It should be noted that 
Whewell used the term “Idea” in a rather unconventional manner: 
 
But it may suffice to observe that we use the word Ideas, in the 
manner already explained, to express that element, supplied by the 
mind itself, which must be combined with Sensation in order to 
produce knowledge. For us, Ideas are not Objects of Thought, but 
rather Laws of Thought. Ideas are not synonymous with Notions; 
they are Principles which give our Notions whatever they contain of 
truth.125 
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These Fundamental Ideas are conditions “without which the 
external world can neither be observed nor conceived” 126 ; they 
“necessarily impose their conditions upon that knowledge of which 
observation supplies the material”127. The goal of The Philosophy of the 
Inductive Sciences was to “not merely to prove that there are such 
Fundamental Ideas or Laws of mental activity, but to enumerate those of 
them which are involved in the existing sciences”128. 
In the Philosophy of the Inductive Science, Whewell reiterated his 
ideas on space, time and causation. Space and time are necessary forms 
belonging to our perceptive power. We cannot conceive of objects or 
events as not occurring in space or in time. They are, properly speaking, 
intuitions: we conceive events occurring in the same absolute space and 
time. 129  The Idea of Time (like all other Fundamental Ideas) is a 
constitutively necessary condition of knowledge130: 
 
By considering time as a form which belongs to our power of 
apprehending occurrences and changes, and under which alone such 
experience can be accepted by the mind, we explain the necessity, 
which we find to exist, of conceiving all such changes as happening 
in time; and we thus see that time is not a property perceived as 
existing in objects, or as conveyed to us by the senses; but a 
condition impressed upon our knowledge by the constitution of the 
mind itself; involving an act of thought as well as an impression of 
sense.131  
 
Whewell made similar statements on the Idea of Space: 
 
As we have before seen that our knowledge of solid space and its 
properties is not conceivable in any other way than as the result of a 
mental act, governed by conditions depending on its own nature; so 
it now appears that our perception of visible figures are not 
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obtained without an act performed under the same 
conditions. The sensations of touch and sight are subordinated to an 
idea which is the basis of our speculative knowledge concerning 
space and its relations; and this same idea is disclosed to our 
consciousness by its practically regulating our intercourse with the 
external world.132 
 
By means of the Idea of Cause (which is also not derived from 
experience and which occupies centre-stage in the mechanical sciences) 
we constantly perceive the world around us in terms of successions of 
causes and effects. The empiricist cannot explain the necessary and 
universal truths133 attained in mechanics: 
 
The idea of cause, like the ideas of space and time, is a part of the 
active powers of the mind. The relation of cause and effect is a 
relation or condition under which events are apprehended, which 
relation is not given by observation, but supplied by the mind 
itself. 134  […] We have, in the Mechanical Sciences, certain 
universal and necessary truths on the subject of causes. Now any 
view which refers our belief in causation to mere experience or 
habit, cannot explain the possibility of necessary truths, since 
experience and habit can never lead to a perception of necessary 
connection.135 
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Perceiving the world in terms of successions of causes and effects is 
also “a condition of our apprehending successive events”136. Whewell 
considered Fundamental Ideas as the conditions under which we think of 
events.137 The necessity and universality of truths is derived “from the 
Fundamental Ideas which those truths involve”: 
 
These ideas entirely shape and circumscribe our knowledge; they 
regulate the active operations of our minds, without which our 
passive sensations do not become knowledge. They govern these 
operations according to rules which are not only fixed and 
permanent, but which may be expressed in plain and definite terms; 
and these rules, when thus expressed, may be made the basis of 
demonstrations by which the necessary relations imparted to our 
knowledge by our Ideas may be traced to their consequences in the 
most remote ramifications of scientific truth. 138 
 
A Fundamental Idea can only be partially described by means of Axioms, 
i.e. “enunciations of the necessary and evident conditions imposed upon 
our knowledge by the Fundamental Ideas which it involves”139. From 
these Axioms we derive propositions that are applicable to the empirical 
world.140  
          In the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Whewell generalized 
his ideas on the necessity of the laws of mechanics to other laws in 
different branches of science. It should be noted that he remained very 
vague as to what axioms guided other sciences. On how, for instance, the 
Idea of Polarity could be enunciated in axiomatic terms which are 
subsequently interpreted empirically, Whewell was never explicit. It 
therefore remains unclear how his treatment could be extended to other 
scientific disciplines. 
To conclude this section, I clarify that Whewell’s philosophy of 
knowledge in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences involved two 
different types of necessity: (1) one which obtains between a 
Fundamental Idea and its corresponding Axiom (constitutive necessity), 
and (2) another which obtains between Axioms and scientific theorems 
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or laws (interpretative necessity). 141  Human beings can 
only know a Fundamental Idea partially by its Axioms. We can only 
obtain some glimpses of Fundamental Ideas, under the aspect of Axioms. 
The Axioms are necessary because they give a partial description of the 
constitutively necessary conditions of our perception. In other words, 
what they describe is constitutively necessary of our nature as 
experiential beings. This notion of necessity can be described as follows: 
 
Constitutive Necessity: Axioms are necessarily true because 
they partially describe a corresponding Fundamental Idea, 
which refers to the constitutively necessary conditions of our 
knowledge of the world. 
 
By contrast, the laws of motion are necessary from their being 
interpretations of the Axioms of Causation. For instance, the second law 
of motion, which asserts that forces are measured by their accelerative 
effects, is an interpretation of the Axiom according to which effects are 
measured by their effects. It is an interpretation because it instantiates 
the form of the Axiom and also because it concretises the general terms 
“cause” and “effect” into empirical counterparts. Such concretization is 
necessary to arrive at proper knowledge of the world: 
 
It must be allowed, on the other hand, that so long as these 
formulae are not interpreted by real study of nature, they are nor 
only useless but also prejudicial; filling men’s mind minds with 
vague general terms, empty maxims, and unintelligible 
abstractions, which they mistake for knowledge.142 
 
This aspect of Whewell’s concept of necessity can thus be described as 
follows: 
 
Interpretative Necessity: The laws of nature are necessary 
because they are empirical interpretations of necessary 
Axioms, i.e. they add the required empirical contents to the 
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abstract form of the Axioms in order to arrive at 
scientific laws.  
 
As the Axioms of Causation get their interpretation from the material 
provided by phenomena, they become laws of motion.143 Taken jointly, 
the concept(s) of necessity that are present in Whewell’s Philosophy of 
the Inductive Sciences can be described as follows: 
 
Constitutive and Interpretative Necessity: The laws of 
nature are necessarily true because they are empirical 
interpretations of necessary Axioms which derive 
ultimately from the constitutively necessary conditions of 
our knowledge of the world, i.e. from Fundamental Ideas. 
 
 
4. In conclusion 
 
In Whewellian terminology, we might say that Kant, in his published 
works, only had addressed constitutive necessity and not interpretative 
necessity, i.e. he did not show how a priori principles could be given 
empirical content by intermediary concepts. With his analysis of the laws 
of nature as empirical instantiations and concretizations of the Axioms 
that partially reveal their corresponding Fundamental Idea, Whewell 
sketched how he thought that Kant’s problem of bridging the gap 
between the metaphysical foundations of natural science and physics 
could be solved. The intermediary concepts that Kant was trying to 
establish correspond to the Axioms in Whewell’s philosophy. 
If the above analysis is correct, then we have shown that 
Whewell’s account of the Idea of Cause (and by extension, his doctrine 
of Fundamental Ideas in general) grew out of his dissatisfaction with 
Kantian philosophy of science and its seeming inability to solve the 
bridging-problem. This analysis throws new light on the importance of 
Kantianism in Whewell’s philosophy, for we have shown that Whewell 
took over and transformed Kant’s idea of a priori principles as conditions 
for the establishment of proper knowledge about the world (without 
always clinging to Kant’s exact differentiation between them) and that 
Whewell was trying to address a typical Kantian topic: namely, to show 
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how scientific knowledge could be both empirical and necessary and 
how the gap between metaphysics and physics could be bridged. 
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